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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals involving a
charge of a first degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (2001).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Ms. White was required to
demonstrate a highly provocative and contemporaneous triggering event as a prerequisite
to presenting an affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress.
The Supreme Court Order granting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari identifying
the issue is found at Addendum B.
Standard of Review:
This Court has identified the following standard of review for a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals and for the issue presented herein.

"On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its
conclusions of law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, *{ 10, 82 P.3d 1106
(citations omitted). Whether a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is
appropriate presents a question of law. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238
(Utah 1992). When considering whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser
included offense jury instruction, we "view the evidence and the inferences that
can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense." State v. Crick,
iv

675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 1983). In addition, when the defense requests a jury
instruction on a lesser included offense, the requirements for inclusion of the
instruction "should be liberally construed." State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424
(Utah 1986).
State v. Spillers. 152 P.3d 315. 2007 UT 13. ^T10.
Trial court conclusions of law are reviewed by Utah appellate courts under a
correction of error standard granting no deference to the trial court for its legal
conclusions. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App
241,31 P.3d615.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

Amendment V, Constitution of the United States (full text)
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (in pertinent part): [Extreme Emotional Distress]

v

(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that
the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of
another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse;
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or
the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OFUTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee.

)>

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE,
Defendant/Appellant.

]
[
)

Case No. 20090322

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals holding
that an accused is required to demonstrate a highly provocative and
contemporaneous triggering event as a prerequisite to presenting an affirmative
defense of extreme emotional distress.1 The trial court, Judge William W. Barrett,
Third Judicial District Court, denied the pretrial motion by the Defendant seeking
permission to permit the jury to hear and to be instructed on the defense of
extreme emotional distress.

1

This defense is codified within the Homicide statute at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(4). The extreme emotional distress defense is more accurately and completely
stated as "extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse." Ms. White will refer to the defense intending its full verbiage with the
shorthand of "extreme emotional distress."

1

That ruling of the district court was challenged by Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court which transferred the Petition to the Utah
Court of Appeals. R. 697. The Utah Court of Appeals granted the petition to
review the interlocutory order on January 31, 2008. The Court of Appeals then
affirmed the lower court in its decision State of Utah v. Brenda White, 206 P.3d
646, 2009 UT App 81. Copy of Order attached at Addendum A.
Appellant then petitioned this Court by Petition for Writ of Certiorari
asking the Court to correct the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court
granted that Petition for Writ of Certiorari on July 28, 2009, as to the following
issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Petitioner was required to
demonstrate a highly provocative and contemporaneous triggering event as a
prerequisite to an affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. Copy of
Order attached at Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Brenda Christine White was charged by Amended Information with two
counts of criminal conduct: Attempted Murder, a First Degree Felony, and
Criminal Mischief, a second degree felony. The charges stemmed from a single
event occurring the 26th day of April, 2006, at 4021 South 700 East, a building
complex known as the Woodlands Tower II, in Salt Lake County. R. 1-3.

2

On April 265 2006, Brenda White arrived at the Woodland Towers office
building to meet with her ex-husband Jon White to acquire his participation in
refinancing the home mortgage as he had previously and repeatedly promised. Jon
White told her to return later to talk. R. 711 at 31-33.
The couple had been married for eleven years; two children were born
during the marriage. R. 711 at 28? 65-67. Jon White moved out of the home prior
to Thanksgiving in November of 2005. Id. As a result of a mediation agreement,
Jon White had promised to assist in refinancing the two mortgages, giving up his
equity in the house to Ms. White in lieu of making any payments of alimony or
paying any bills, including any portion of either of the mortgages. R 711 at 32.
Jon White, however, then refused to cooperate with the refinance leaving her in
financial disaster. She returned and they talked about the refinancing; he refused
to assist with the refinancing as he had promised. Instead Jon White utilized his
leverage on her need for the refinance to pressure her to sign divorce papers.
R.711 at 36. Jon White returned to work and she left the area. R 711 at 34, 40.
Ms. White returned later that day, around 4:30 p.m., to again beseech her
ex-husband for the assistance he had promised. R. 446, 448. She observed him
exiting the office complex talking on a cell phone, a cell phone that he had
repeatedly told her he did not own. R. 711 at 75. Ms. White had tried for months
to obtain cell phone information from Jon White to facilitate communications with
their children and to arrange visiting schedules for the two children. Jon White

3

had repeatedly responded that he did not posses a cell phone. R. 448-49; 711 at
75.
The State's probable cause statement from the Information describes the
next events as follows:
The defendant drove over the raised curb of the parking structure
[where Jon White was leaving work] and chased Mr. White through the
parking lot as he ran toward the Woodland Towers. Mr. White entered the
east side of the building through a double set of glass doors. Mr. White
continued to run through the building to a lobby on the west side. The
defendant drove her vehicle through the glass doors and down a hallway to
the lobby. The defendant struck Mr. White with the explorer, causing Mr.
White to flip over the vehicle and fall to the ground. The defendant drove
through the lobby windows and stopped her vehicle. The defendant put
her vehicle in reverse and backed into the lobby. Mr. White stood up and
fled down a side hallway. The defendant turned her car around in the
lobby and stopped the vehicle.
Mr. White received several cuts and abrasion to his hands, legs,
arms and face. Mr. White's ankle was dislocated.
R. 2-3. A more detailed version of the facts of those events is contained in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order prepared by the prosecution
and found in Addendum C. That rendition of the facts includes a recitation of Jon
White's testimony from the preliminary hearing which indicates that after he had
again refused to cooperate and assist in the refinance, Ms. White played a song on
her car radio which contained the lyrics, "I want to kill you. I want to blow you
away." Ms. White joined her fingers together, mimicked as a gun; and as the
music played told him that when her father took her shooting, she thought about
shooting him. Jon White testified that this action was repeated numerous times.

4

Jon White also testified that she also referred to him as a parasite and that she was
going to wipe him off the earth. Id.; R. 711 at 35-38.
A preliminary hearing on the matter was held December 1, 2006. During
the preliminary hearing the prosecutor inquired how long prior to the divorce had
he contemplated thoughts or discussions of divorce. R. 711 at 60-65. Jon White
testified that over five years it progressively had gotten worse. He also indicated
he had moved out earlier in 2004 for a period of time. During cross-examination
of Jon White, the defense attempted to inquire into specifics about the
deterioration of the marriage, manipulation of Ms. White, the divorce and other
related issues. R. 711 at 60-64. The court initially permitted that questioning over
the objection of the State. However, when the defense began to explore questions
regarding sexual relations, the State objected again. R. 711 at 70-72. The defense
insisted that not only had the State opened the door, but also indicated its intent to
present and develop the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress through
such questioning. The court ruled that the defense could question Jon White about
anything he may have done to try to provoke his ex-wife but sustained the
objection about sexual relations. Id., R. 711 at 74-76.
The State sought a clarification of the magistrate's use of the term
"provocation" attempting to limit the inquiry to only events of the day of the
alleged crimes. R. 711 at 71. An in-chambers discussion occurred where the
defense proffered the testimony of certain actions and events which the exhusband employed over the more recent period of the marriage to manipulate and
5

distress Ms. White. R. 711 at 74-82. This testimony included Jon White's
treatment of Ms. White through the marriage, including a rather recent period of
Jon White's marital infidelity, an extra-marital affair with a co-worker. R. 711 at
75-76. The defense also proffered an instance later in the marriage documented by
a police investigation and report of the possession and use/abuse of child
pornography by Jon White. R. 711 at 73-75. Additionally, the defense introduced
a proffer describing a sexual tryst the ex-husband had arranged where he
orchestrated a "threesome" with yet another co-worker and Ms. White. R. 711 at
74-80.
Other problems existed in the marriage and more specifically the
dissolution of the marriage and were proffered to the district court in support of
the motion in limine. R. 714. Ms. White and the children were not receiving any
financial support from Jon White from the time he left at Thanksgiving of 2005
and she was forced to make a mediation agreement in January to settle the divorce
on the promise of getting some money to support the family. Poor legal advice
assured her that giving up monthly income via alimony, house and bill payments
was a fair trade for his half of the equity in the home. R. 443-50. There were no
temporary orders obtained by her lawyer to provide for interim payments and the
settlement agreement signed in January provided none, except for child support
beginning in March. Id.
Ms. White was on medications for anxiety, depression and sleep. R. 444.
During this time Jon White was to provide health coverage for the family but on
6

two separate occasions he cancelled the coverage causing a lapse in her ability to
acquire the medication which resulted in an increase in her anger, her depression
and all that went with it. Ms. White, on one occasion, was required to go to Jon
White's workplace herself to have the insurance benefits reinstated. In the
meantime she was without her medications. She had no money to pay for them.
Moreover, she deteriorated in her mental state and ability to deal with all that was
going on around her. Id.
She was a single mother of two children working a $ 12.50 cent an hour
job, at a telephone call center, with new financial obligations of approximately $
1,400.00 per month on a first and second mortgage, plus credit card debt resulting
from the marriage of another $ 200.00 to $ 300.00 per month and all the other
family expenses. R. 433, 443-450.
Ms. White had to increase her work from part-time to full time; and in fact,
began to work overtime—often working up to as much as 60-70 hours a week to
try and make ends meet. Id. Ms. White saw less of her children than before which
resulted in additional stressors from the children. And at the same time, Jon White
began to withdraw from participating with the children. R. 446. Jon White would
make the visits difficult for Ms. White; for example, he would insist on an 8 o'
clock pickup of the children on times when he knew Ms. White was in a group
counseling class that did not terminate until 8 p.m. Id. He would require that Ms.
White leave the counseling sessions early to pick up the children at 8 p.m., rather
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than waiting until 8:15 p.m., or he would require her to arrange for someone else
to do so.
As money became more difficult her ability to pay for medications
decreased and her doctor assisted by providing sample packets of the medications
whenever she could. However, that doctor died in early April leaving her without
a treatment doctor and without appropriate medication. R. 446-47; 711 at 79.
The mediation agreement, determined in January, to eventually become the
divorce settlement, still left her without finances. The unfortunate settlement
provided that Ms. White would receive the equity in the home, but would be
required to pay from that equity an approximated additional $ 10,000.00 of debt
accumulated during the marriage. Of course, she had to pay these bills in the
interim, while waiting for the settlement date to arrive. R. 447.
While the settlement agreement would provide Ms. White with child
support of approximately $ 650.00 per month, no relief was in sight. R. 447. She
fell behind in house and bill payments despite working so much overtime. As part
of the settlement agreement urged on her by her counsel, Jon White insisted that
he not participate in paying the house payments and that he surrender his half of
the equity in trade for no alimony and no payments. Id.
The unfortunate reality of the settlement was that the equity she now had in
the home was of no value unless she could get the money out and pay the living
expenses, mortgages and other bills. Id. If she could not refinance the mortgages
and get the equity out to live on she could even lose the house. Ms. White began
8

to see the potential of this reality after the settlement and her finances did not
improve. R. 447-48. She desired to refinance the home to free up that money to
live on and pay the bills as anticipated in the agreement. However, due to her
short work history, large debt and late payments, Ms. White could not get a loan to
refinance the home. Ms. White approached Jon White for the assistance with the
refinance that he had promised, and he vacillated and backed out of his agreement
to do so. R. 447-48; 711 at 33-35.
Ms. White could not obtain the refinancing without him. Id.
She finally contacted new counsel and discussed attempting to re-open the
divorce agreement as unworkable. R. 444, 448.
Jon White then agreed to assist with the refinance but then he would back
out again. R. 448.
The relationship between Jon White and the children became more
problematic. He spent less time with them, disappointed them more and was
unavailable for contact. Ms. White requested that he provide his cell phone
number to her so the kids could contact him directly, but he repeatedly told her
that he did not have one. R. 448-49. He was becoming less and less involved in
caring for and caring about his family. Id.
The day of the incident, April 26th, Ms. White went to Jon White's
workplace earlier in the day to speak with him and have him talk on the phone to
the mortgage broker. He refused to do so until later in the day. When she went
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back the second time, he spoke with the mortgage broker but he would not
cooperate in the refinance. R. 711 at 33-34.
During the second visit Ms. White spoke with Jon White again about the
refinance of the mortgages and assisting in providing for his children. Ms. White
felt he had promised to assist her in releasing the equity from the home. R. 448.
When Ms. White saw Jon White leave the workplace talking on a cell
phone, a cell phone that he denied owning for communication with the children.
Ms. White was overcome with all that has been described above. R. 449. Her
anger, agitation, loss, grief and the disappointment for her and the children
resulted in her inability to control herself. Those emotions controlled her actions.
R. 448-49.
These events and others including the fact that Ms. White was only recently
aware that Jon White now was actively dating the co-worker with whom he had
the affair, were at the base of the defense theory of the case supporting the request
to permit the defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury. R. 447-49. All of
these events were described as occurring within the last two to three years, some
even more recent in time and prior to the offenses in question. R. 711 at 76.
The district court denied the motion in limine. R. 648; R. 715. Both the
State and the trial court agreed with the defense request to petition for
interlocutory review and indicated that appellate review and guidance would be of
benefit to lower courts and should be sought. R. 715 at 11. The Utah Supreme
Court transferred that petition to the Utah Court of Appeals which granted the
10

petition. The Court of Appeals decision, State v. White, 206 P.3d 646, 2009 UT
App 81, affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion in limine. Ms. White then
petitioned for Writ of Certiorari which this court granted on the issue presented
herein. Addendum B.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that Utah law requires
that before an accused may present the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
distress to the jury she must demonstrate a highly provocative and
contemporaneous triggering event as a prerequisite to relying on the defense. This
decision is in error. This Court should find the facts of this case to be more than
sufficient evidence to meet the correct standard of presenting the case to the jury
on the defense of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.
While the State may take from the same evidence and claim an intentional
act to attempt to commit murder, reasonable minds may differ whether the
reasonable person under those same stressors and circumstances would have an
extreme emotional reaction to it and experience a loss of self-control such that the
person's reason would be overborne by the intense feelings discussed above.
That understanding is all that is required for this Court to reverse the decisions of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court and authorize introduction of the defense.

11

This argument is particularly compelling when the cases cited and relied on by the
Court of Appeals predate the change in statutory language in the defense from
"extreme emotional disturbance" to "extreme emotional distress T
In Ms. White's case, no single violent event triggered her behavior. Rather
a loss of self control arguably occurred due to a lengthy repeated and escalating
pressure overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief,
excessive agitation and similar emotions. These stressors very realistically were
extreme and overwhelming for someone under the then existing circumstances
reasonably brought about over time by the external forces of Jon White's behavior
towards her, coupled with the escalating financial pressures and extreme family
and work stressors, including the death of her doctor and counselor and the
changes in her medicine regime. Her circumstances meet the requirements of
submitting the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN
ACCUSED IS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE A HIGHLY
PROVOCATIVE AND CONTEMPORANEOUS TRIGGERING
EVENT AS A PREREQUISITE TO PRESENTING THE
STATUTORY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXTREME
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE JURY.

The Utah Court of Appeals decision concludes that Ms. White was required
and failed to demonstrate a highly provocative and contemporaneous triggering
event as a prerequisite to presenting the statutory affirmative defense of extreme
12

emotional distress to the jury.2 That decision is contrary to Utah case authority
and not supported by the cases the Court of Appeals relies on for its conclusions.

a. Ms. White enjoys the right to present her defense to the jury.
It has long been the law that a Defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on her theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to
support that theory. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980)(emphasis
added). Ms. White indicated an intent to rely on the defense of "extreme
emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse," an
affirmative defense. As an affirmative defense, much like self defense, the

2

The trial court denied Ms. White's motion in limine to present the defense
of extreme emotional distress to the jury by making four distinct conclusions of
law. R. 651-52.; Addendum C at 4-5. The trial court denied the motion by
concluding as a matter of law that Ms. White did not present sufficient evidence to
justify an argument to the jury that she suffered from extreme emotional distress
when she allegedly committed the offenses in question. Conclusion # 1; R. 651;
Addendum C at 4. The trial court then omitted an important subjective statutory
perspective (the viewpoint of the reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances) when it concluded as a matter of law that factors proffered by Ms.
White would not cause the average reasonable person to suffer from extreme
emotional distress. Conclusion # 2; R. 651; Addendum C at 4-5.
The third conclusion of the trial court erroneously determined that Ms.
White's claimed defense of extreme emotional distress was inadequate as a matter
of law due to stressors being too remote in time and lacking a highly provocative
triggering event. Conclusion # 3; R. 652; Addendum C at 5. Finally, the fourth
conclusion of law replaced the trial court's judgment for that of a jury and
concluded pre-trial that Ms. White did not lose self-control, had a plan and was
aware of what she was doing as evidenced by the complicated driving pattern of
negotiating a chase and a crash into the lobby of an office building in pursuit of
her alleged victim. Conclusion # 4; R. 652; Addendum C at 5.
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defendant desiring to utilize that defense must initially demonstrate a sufficient
basis from which jurors may reasonably entertain the defense in order for the
question to be submitted to the jury. This Court has instructed on this basic due
process principle:
If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict with the State's
proof, be such that the jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether
or not he acted in self-defense, he is entitled to have the jury instructed
fully and clearly on the law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight as to be incapable of
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to whether a defendant
accused of a crime acted in self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are
properly refused.
Id. at 265-66 (quoting State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah I960)).
Even recently the Court has discussed and reasserted the right to the
affirmative defense instruction of extreme emotional distress when the Defendant
requests that it be given. This Court stated:
When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a
particular affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction
if evidence has been presented—either by the prosecution or by the
defendant—that provides any reasonable basis upon which a jury could
conclude that the affirmative defense applies to the defendant. See State v.
Knoll 712 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985) ("[W]hen there is a basis in the
evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the
defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to
conclude that a killing was done to protect the defendant from an imminent
threat of death by another, an instruction on self-defense should be given
the jury."); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (stating that a
party is "entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its
theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify
it").
We have applied this rule with respect to the affirmative defenses of
imperfect self-defense manslaughter and extreme emotional distress
manslaughter. See State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13,ffi[16, 23, 152 P.3d 315;
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State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,ffij13, 14, 63 P.3d 94: For example, in
Spillers, we held that a criminal defendant was entitled to a jury
instruction on imperfect self-defense manslaughter because the evidence
presented by the defendant could have been interpreted by the jury to
establish imperfect self-defense. 2007 UT 13, ^j 23. We also held that the
defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress
manslaughter because Ma rational jury could, adopting Defendant's version
of events, find that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress for which
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot [the victim]." Id
116.
State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867, 2008 UT 58 atffij25-26.
The Utah Court of Appeals had itself reaffirmed this proposition in stating,
"It is well established that a "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on
his theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support that
theory." State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 44-45 (Utah App.l990)(quoting State v.
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980)(emphasis in original)).
Ms. White insists there is ample basis in the evidence developed thus far,
and perhaps even additional evidence to be developed, to support her theory of
the affirmative defense that she suffered from extreme emotional distress for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse at the time of the criminal events
as alleged by the State in this matter.
Case law supports her position. The Utah Supreme Court has discussed
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress and rather decidedly
3

Ms. White refers to the fact that the trial court indicated its willingness to allow
the alleged victim to be deposed and the answers to the questions desired at the
preliminary hearing (and others) obtained from Jon White. R. 713 at 15. Such
questions would undoubtedly develop additional information in support of the type
and depth of stressors placed on Ms. White. Due to the current posture of the
case, however, such a deposition has yet to occur.
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dispelled the errors contained in the Court of Appeals analysis and the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94, 2002
UT 124, this Court ruled:
We conclude that defendant was entitled to an instruction under [extreme
emotional distress] because a jury could conclude that [Shumway] caused
the death of [the victim] "under the influence of extreme emotional distress
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." In holding that the
defendant was entitled to an instruction under [extreme emotional
distress], we do not suggest that [Shumway's] version of the events that
took place is the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Most
disturbing, of course, is the fact that the medical examiner testified that
Christopher had been stabbed thirty-nine times. However, in State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264, 266 (Utah 1988), we approved of the giving
of instructions for manslaughter and self-defense based on the defendant's
theory of the case where he had stabbed the victim 107 times. See also
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753-55 (Utah 1986), in which we held that
the defendant would be entitled to an instruction on extreme emotional
distress manslaughter where the victim had been stabbed twenty-seven
times and died of multiple critical wounds.
Shumway, 63 P.3d at Tj 13.
Again, Shumway underscores the law that a defendant is entitled to present
her theory to the jury if there is any basis in the evidence to support that claim.
Here, in Ms. White's case, there is at least as much credibility in her claim of the
affirmative defense (and Ms. White asserts much more so) than in the claims of
extreme emotional distress that had been withheld from presentation in Shumway
and the Standiford and Cloud opinions cited therein.

b. The trial court erred in requiring a contemporaneous highly
provocative triggering event.
In Shumway, the Court, citing State v. Bishop, stated:
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Turning first to consideration under [extreme emotional disturbance], we
explained in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), that a
person suffers from an extreme emotional disturbance "when he is exposed
to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress" such that the average
reasonable person under that stress would have an extreme emotional
reaction to it, as a result of which he would experience a loss of selfcontrol and that person's reason would be overborne by intense feelings
such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar
emotions. Id. However, an extreme emotional disturbance will not serve
to reduce murder to manslaughter if the actor brought about his own
mental disturbance. Gardner, 789 P.2d 282-83; § 76-5-203(3)(b)(ii).
State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94, \ 9 (Utah 2002)(citations in original)(emphasis
added). All that is required to support the claim for the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance/distress is some external initiating circumstance
accompanied by extremely unusual and overwhelming stress and that a reasonable
person under that stress would have an extreme emotional reaction to it. Bishop,
753P.2dat471.
Notably, since Bishop the statute has been amended and "extreme
emotional disturbance" has been re-written to "extreme emotional distress'" Of
course, a reasonable explanation or excuse is still required, but the change in term
from "disturbance" to "distress" is itself significant. A "disturbance" may be best
defined as a single event where "distress" more easily connotes a build-up over
time. For example, Blacks Law Dictionary defines "disturbance" as "an act" or "a
wrong" where "emotional distress" is defined as "a highly unpleasant mental
reaction (such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from
another person's conduct; emotional pain and suffering." Blacks Law Dictionary,
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8th edition, 511 & 563, respectively. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial
court addressed or accounted for this amended language in assessing the
perspective of Ms. White's circumstances.
In fact, the Court of Appeals opinion is misleading on this point and makes
no distinction between "disturbance" and "distress" as it cites three "disturbance"
cases to support its conclusion that extreme emotional "distress" requires a highly
provocative and contemporaneous triggering event. The Court of Appeals cites to
State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d
861 (Utah 1998); and State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983); and holds that
the highly provocative event must be contemporaneous with the defendant's loss
of self control or such loss of self control cannot be attributed to extreme
emotional distress. White, 2009 UT App 81, ^ 24-25. There are significant
differences in these three cases when compared to Ms. White's case before the
Court that indicates the three cases do not support the appellate court's decision.
First, all three cases, contrary to the language used by the Court of Appeals,
are extreme emotional disturbance cases predating the change in language and not
extreme emotional distress cases. While the Court in Shumway cited to Bishop in
essence re-affirming the language in Bishop to distress cases, the distress cases are
inarguably broader in allowing stressors which occur over time rather than a single
event as defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as quoted above. The distress cases
decided by this Court have allowed reputation evidence and six or seven year old
stressors as relevant evidence to determine the appropriateness of the instruction
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on extreme emotional distress. This Court should reject the Court of Appeals
holding that uses the two interchangeably and makes no distinction between the
terms "disturbance" and "distress."
Second, all three of these cases were analyzed as post trial cases rather than
our current posture of interlocutory review for Ms. White's matter. This
difference in the posture of the case is significant as the cases themselves each
indicate. Price explains that a jury verdict is reviewed for sufficiency and that all
evidence and all inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict of
the jury. 909 P.2d at 262. In Price the appellate court found in support of the
verdict that his claim for the extreme emotional disturbance was devoid of any
evidence to show he was frustrated for having his feeling hurt. Id. at 263. Cf.
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871 (this Court in support of the verdict found no basis
in the evidence to support the view that Piansiaksone killed as a result of extreme
emotional disturbance); and Clayton, 658 P.2d at 626 (this Court in support of the
verdict held evidence offered no rational basis to conclude passion preponderated
over malice to satisfy the requirement of extreme emotional disturbance).
Because of the interlocutory review and pre-trial nature of Ms. White's
case, there is, of course no jury verdict and the prosecution surely is not entitled to
have the facts viewed in the light most favorable to their theory of the case.
Rather, the contrary is true. This Court has long held that whenever considering a
defense requests for such a jury instruction, the court necessarily "view[s] the
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable
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to the defense." Spillers IL 152 P.3d at Tf 10 (quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527,
539 (Utah 1983). The Court also has clarified, correcting the appellate court
ruling, that
a defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion. "The ultimate
burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains
on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove
affirmative defenses or not." ... Accordingly, a defendant is not required
to use particular language or key words in his testimony to identify his
mental state as extreme emotional distress before a jury may consider that
defense in a criminal trial. As long as the evidence presented at trial
supports a defendant's theory of the crime and provides a rational basis for
a verdict on the lesser included offense, a defendant is entitled to the jury
instruction if he requests it.
Id. at Tf 19 (citations omitted).
Spillers II also instructs that the extreme emotional distress request for
instruction is to be considered the same as an instruction on a lesser included
offense and that the instruction "must be given if (i) the statutory elements of
greater and lesser included offenses overlap ... and (ii) the evidence provides a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense." Spillers IL 152 P.3d_at *f 12.

c. Distress need not be and rarely is an isolated event.
The facts in Shumway inarguably provide the necessary clarification and
direction that "distress" as contrasted with "disturbance" need not and perhaps
rarely is an isolated event. Moreover, the initiating circumstance (heretofore
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called a "trigger") was not as highly provocative and violent an initiating event as
described by the State.
In Shumway the Court described that initiating circumstances as follows:
One interpretation of the evidence supports the necessity for a
manslaughter instruction under subsection (3)(a)(i). Brookes [the
defendant] disclosed to police that on the morning of the altercation
Christopher was irritated at him for beating Christopher at video games. As
the boys went to bed, Christopher went to the kitchen and retrieved a knife
that he began to throw in the air and catch. Christopher then lunged at
Brookes and began poking him with the knife. The boys wrestled over
control of the knife and in his anger, Brookes stabbed Christopher.
Brookes also suffered stab wounds to his hand. There was evidence that
Christopher had a reputation for being a "hothead" and losing his temper,
while Brookes was known to be cooperative and peaceful. Other evidence
supported the argument that Brookes had been bullied and pushed around
by his peers since he was in the third grade, and that all of this "came out
on Chris" when the boys fought over the knife.
Id. at ^ 10. The facts revealed that Shumway was 15 years old at the time of the
murder; third graders are 8 or 9 years of age so this particular—and determined to
be a relevant—distress factor relied on by the Court in Shumway was six or seven
years old. Similarly the Court spoke of reputation evidence which by practical
definition cannot be created from a single event but must necessarily be
ascertained over time. This recognition alone supports the importance of a
distress versus disturbance analysis.
This Court recognized in Shumway that circumstances which may have
occurred years prior to the offense could certainly contribute to the defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense, and likewise could be considered by a jury
in determining whether the defendant acted under the influence of "extreme
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emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." The
Court reversed the murder conviction In Shumway because the jury was not
instructed appropriately and was not allowed to determine the reasonableness of
the defendant's acts under those stressors.
This Court also recently reviewed and upheld the Court of Appeals decision
in State v. Spillers. 2005 UT App. 283, 116 P.3d985, afifd 152 P.3d 315 (Utah
2007). There the State had appealed the Court of Appeal's decision claiming that
court erred in reversing the conviction because of the trial court's failure to give an
extreme emotional distress instruction. The State claimed, as the State does here,
that Spillers did not merit the instruction.
[T]he State's assertion rests on its own conclusion that Defendant acted
"rationally" throughout the encounter; however, the question of whether
Defendant acted "rationally" is a question of fact properly belonging to the
jury. While a jury could adopt the State's version of events and convict
Defendant of murder, a jury could also believe Defendant's interpretation
of the evidence and conclude that he was not acting rationally, but rather
was under extreme emotional distress as a result of Jackson's attack and
convict on the lesser offense of manslaughter.
Second, the State contends that Defendant did not present evidence that he
was in fact experiencing "extreme emotional distress." Rather, the State
maintains that Defendant merely testified that he felt nervous and that the
blow to his head left him feeling cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scaredterms not indicative, in the State's view, of extreme emotional distress.
State v. Spillers n i l 152 P.3d 315, 2007 UT 13, ^ 1 8 - 1 9 . 4 The trial court's
conclusions, similar to the State's position in Spillers IL rests on the conclusion

4

The trial court's findings and conclusions made the same error as the State did
here in Spillers II thereby usurping the fact finding duties of the jury and negating
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that defendant acted rationally. As the Court stated there, whether Ms. White
acted rationally here is a question of fact properly presented to the jury.
In contrast, and demonstrating the trial court's error here, the Supreme
Court in Spillers II characterized those facts as follows:
Like Shumway this case could be interpreted to support Defendant's
contention that he experienced extreme emotional distress and was
therefore entitled to a manslaughter instruction. Defendant testified that he
and Jackson were arguing prior to the altercation and that Jackson was
upset with him, accusing him of snitching to drug enforcement officers.
The tone of the conversation made Defendant nervous. Defendant stated
that Jackson retrieved a firearm and struck Defendant on the back of the
head. Defendant testified that the blow left him cloudy, dazed,
uncomfortable, and scared. According to the nurse's testimony, the blow
may have resulted in a two-inch hematoma that was present on Defendant's
head the day after the shooting. Defendant testified that after being struck,
he turned to face Jackson, who was cocking his arm back to strike
Defendant again. At that point. Defendant shot Jackson three times,
although at trial he testified that he remembered firing only a single shot.
Further, witnesses testified that Jackson had a reputation for violence.
Thus, a rational jury could, adopting Defendant's version of events, find
that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot Jackson.
Id. at TI16. This case, like Shumway, relies on the initiating incident only as the
starting point for the analysis allowing the jury to determine the reasonableness, if
any, to the claimed affirmative defense. Again, a reputation is acquired over time,
permitting something less than a single highly provocative triggering event to
justify granting the defense. The trial court's opinion to the contrary is erroneous

her right to present her affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress.
Addendum C at 5.
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as is the Court of Appeals decision affirming that ruling. R. 652; Addendum C at
5.
The defense of extreme emotional distress is more completely defined in the
statute, in pertinent part, as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(4):
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the
death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse;
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection
(4)(a)(i) ... shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person
under the then existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(emphasis added).
The trial court's conclusion misunderstands the statute as applied to Ms.
White. Its conclusion fatally omitted a critical subjective component to the
defense, to wit: the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse "shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances"' Likewise, the trial court's conclusion does not take the analysis
far enough. Its second conclusion failed to employ the subjective component of
the statutory defense. See R. 651-52; Addendum C at 4-5.
The correct inquiry is not simply asking "would a reasonable person have
done what defendant did?" Rather, the reasonableness standard evaluates the
defendant's excuse or explanation for the behavior; the circumstances as they
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existed for the defendant. The reasonableness requirement evaluates the
defendant's excuse, not her actions. The proper inquiry demands that "the
reasonableness of the explanation or excuse should be determined from the
viewpoint of the average, reasonable person under the then-existing
circumstances:' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988)(emphasis
added). This determination "should be made by viewing the subjective, internal
situation in which the defendant found himself and the external circumstances as
he perceived them at the time, however inaccurate that perception may have been,
and assessing from that standpoint whether the explanation or excuse for his
emotional disturbance was reasonable, so as to entitle him to a reduction of the
crime charged from murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first
degree." People v. Casassa, 404N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980).
Notably, Casassa was rejected by the Court of Appeals as unhelpful
because the language of the subjective nature of the statute in Casassa required the
determination of reasonableness to be made under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be as compared to our current statute which requires
the reasonableness viewpoint analysis to occur under the then existing
circumstances. This distinction, however, is not sufficiently persuasive to reject
the authority, nor the subjective perspective, as the appellate court's distinction is
a distinction in degree and not the subjective nature of the viewpoint.
Even the objective reasonableness component of the extreme emotional
distress defense does not ask the jury whether a reasonable person would behave
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in such a way. Indeed, the Court recognized that the State unsuccessfully made
this flawed argument in Shumway, urging that "no reasonable person.. .teased by a
good friend playing with a knife during a sleepover, would have become so
enraged or experience such an extreme emotional disturbance as to cause him to
kill that person by cutting his throat and stabbing him thirty-nine times."
Shumway, 63 P.3d at ^f 12. As a New York court explained, "[i]t should be
stressed that the issue.. .is not whether the defendant's act of killing his wife was a
reasonable response under the circumstances for, clearly, it was not. Rather, the
issue is the reasonableness of the explanation offered for the defendant's extreme
emotional reaction." People v. Liebman, 583 N.Y.S.2d 234, 241 (N.Y.A.D. 1
Dept. 1992).

d. Cumulative effects from stressors permissibly justify the defense of
extreme emotional distress.
In a recognized landmark case addressing extreme emotional distress, a
New York court illuminated the long history leading to the recognition of the
cumulative effect of events in these cases:
An action influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one that is
necessarily so spontaneously undertaken. Rather, it may be that a
significant mental trauma has affected a defendant's mind for a substantial
period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then
inexplicably coming to the fore. The differences between the present New
York statute and its predecessor and its ancient Maine analogue can be
explained by the tremendous advances made in psychology since 1881 and
a willingness on the part of the courts, legislators, and the public to reduce
the level of responsibility imposed on those whose capacity has been
diminished by mental trauma. It is consistent with modern criminological
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thought to reduce the defendant's criminal liability upon proof of mitigating
circumstances which render his conduct less blameworthy.
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976).
Another court listed several examples of cases where extreme emotional
distress was determined to be a result of cumulative effects:
[I]n every case we have read there has been some connection between the
victim and the slayer precipitating or aggravating an emotional response in
the defendant. See, e.g., Elliott, supra (defendant, who shot his brother, was
acting under an extreme emotional disturbance caused by combination of
child-custody problems, the inability to maintain a recently purchased
home, and an overwhelming fear of his brother); Ratliff v. Comonwealth,
567 S.W.2d 307 (Ky.1978) (defendant believed victim was a conspirator
against her); People v. Cassasa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769, 404
N.E.2d 1310 (1980), cert, denied 449 U.S. 842, 101 S.Ct. 122, 66 L.Ed.2d
50 (1980) (victim rejected defendant as a suitor)
State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 659 (N.D. 1982).
The Elliott matter, noted above, is particularly instructive as therein the
court stated the following as very similar evidence to Ms. White's case was
introduced about the claimed defense that had been denied the defendant.
The defendant offered into evidence the testimony of a psychiatrist
who interviewed the defendant about eleven months after the shooting. The
psychiatrist testified that the defendant, at the time of the shooting, was
acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance caused by
a combination of child custody problems, the inability to maintain a
recently purchased home and an overwhelming fear of his brother. The
psychiatrist placed particular emphasis on the history of conflict between
the two brothers, noting that the defendant referred to his brother as a
"ranger killer." The defendant told the psychiatrist that at one time his
brother pulled him from a bus and chased him with a tire iron. The
defendant stated that this incident was so frightening that it caused him to
leave the area for a couple of years. The psychiatrist believed that this
incident compounded by many other extenuating circumstances resulted in
the defendant's overwhelming fear of his brother. And he testified that
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these circumstances taken together constituted a reasonable explanation of
the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance.
State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 2, 411 A.2d 3, 8 (1979)(emphasis added). The court
there found that the jury should have been instructed on the correct subjective
perspective and reversed the conviction remanding for a new trial. Id. at 10.
Accordingly, as Ms. White has urged, our courts have recognized that there
are factors or events that may have occurred long before the offense which are
relevant and therefore appropriately must be considered by a jury in determining
whether an accused has acted under the influence of "extreme emotional distress
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." The initiating event need
not be a violent or tumultuous event. All that is required is that there be "some
external initiating circumstance" bringing out the distress accompanied by
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that a reasonable person under
that stress as viewed under the then existing circumstances would have an extreme
emotional reaction to it. This determination in this case is a question for the jury
to decide.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled that that Ms. White was required to
demonstrate a highly provocative and contemporaneous triggering event as a
prerequisite to an affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. Ms. White is
entitled to her theory of the defense if any evidence supports it from which the
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jury could return such a verdict. While there are other theories and interpretations
form the evidence, our case posture is pretrial and there are ample reasons to
conclude that a decision finding that Ms. White acted under extreme emotional
distress is possible and she should be permitted to make that argument and be
entitled to present her affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals decision sweeps
too broadly and forecloses too many from the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional distress and should be overturned by this Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^/

day of September, 2009.

Attorney for Ms. White
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OPINION
BENCH. Judge:
Tf 1 In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant Brenda Christine White challenges
the denial of her motion in limine to include a jury instruction regarding the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. Contrary to Defendant's
argument, the trial court did not err in evaluating the proffered evidence through
an objective viewpoint. Nor did the trial court err in its conclusion that a highly
provocative, contemporaneous trigger is required for Defendant's reaction to
qualify as extreme emotional distress. As the triggering factors proffered by
Defendant do not reach this level, the trial court correctly determined that she was
not entitled to a jury instruction on this affirmative defense. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
f 2 Defendant and the victim, Jon White, were married for eleven years before
Mr. White left the marital home and initiated divorce proceedings. According to
Defendant, Mr. White had caused stress for her during the marriage due to his
infidelity, his use of pornography, and his pressuring her to participate in a sexual
"three-some." The couple's separation in November 2005 had caused additional
stress to Defendant due to Mr. White's subsequent failure to provide financial
support, his withdrawal from contact with their children, and his cancellation of
Defendant's health insurance coverage at a time when she needed medication for
anxiety, depression, and sleep. The mediation of the couple's property settlement
had also, in Defendant's eyes, produced an unfair result and burdened her with
financial obligations that she struggled to meet during the time between entering
into the settlement agreement and the fmalization of the divorce.

^f 3 In an attempt to address her mounting financial difficulties, Defendant
sought to refinance the home that she had received as part of the property
settlement. When she learned that she could not obtain refinancing without Mr.
White's assistance, she requested his help. According to Defendant, Mr. White
agreed to help but subsequently vacillated between cooperating and refusing to
cooperate in the refinancing process.
f 4 On April 26, 2006, shortly after noon, Defendant went to Mr. White's
workplace to speak with him regarding the refinancing of the home. Mr. White
approached Defendant, explained that she needed to leave because she had
"harassed employees [t]here before," and accompanied her to the elevator and out
of the building. Once outside, Defendant and Mr. White discussed the terms of the
property settlement and the refinancing of the home. Mr. White refused to sign a
quitclaim deed as requested by Defendant until Defendant took his name off the
two mortgages encumbering the home. While they stood outside Mr. White's
workplace, Defendant had Mr. White speak to the bank officer on her cell phone
where he reiterated his position.
•fl 5 Mr. White concluded the phone call and walked Defendant back to her car
where they continued to discuss the issue of the quitclaim deed and refinancing.
The conversation escalated in intensity, and Defendant raised her voice and
impugned Mr. White. Defendant began repeatedly playing a song on her car stereo
called "Angry Johnny," in which the lyrics state, "Johnny, Johnny, angry
Johnny.... I want to kill you; I want to blow you away." Each time the singer sang
the words "I want to blow you away," Defendant lip-synced the words, formed her
hands in the shape of a gun, and pointed them at Mr. White's head. She did this
over thirty times. Defendant also stated, "Isn't this great how songs can just
motivate people? Wouldn't this be great if it was a true song?" Defendant also
mentioned that her father took her "out shooting guns a lot" and that "[e]very time
he teaches [her] how to shoot a *649 gun, [she] thinks [she's] shooting [Mr.
White]."
Tf 6 Defendant eventually stopped playing the song and told Mr. White that she
needed money for daycare. Mr. White agreed to pay, but Defendant would not tell
him where the children were attending daycare. Defendant withdrew her request
for daycare money and told Mr. White she wanted to terminate his parental rights.
The conversation ended and Mr. White returned to work. As they parted,
Defendant stated, "You are a parasite on this earth and I'm going to wipe you off
this earth."
T{ 7 Approximately four hours later, Defendant returned to Mr. White's
workplace. As she waited in the parking area in her Ford Explorer, Defendant saw

Mr. White exit the building and walk toward his car while talking on a cell phone.
According to Defendant, Mr. White had repeatedly denied owning a cell phone
and had used this purported lack of a cell phone as an excuse for his lack of
communication with the children and the difficulties in arranging visitation
schedules for them. Defendant would later proffer that seeing Mr. White talking
on the cell phone caused all the accumulated stress from the marriage and
separation to overwhelm her, which in turn caused a sudden burst of anger,
agitation, loss, grief, and disappointment.
% 8 As she watched Mr. White talking on his cell phone, Defendant drove her
vehicle toward him, accelerating quickly. When Mr. White heard tires squealing,
he jumped between two parked cars and then over a three-foot cement wall at the
end of the covered parking structure. Mr. White ran back through the visitor
parking lot and toward the building. As he approached the east entrance of the
building, Defendant sped through the visitor parking lot in Mr. White's direction
and turned the vehicle toward the building. Mr. White ran through the first set of
doors, and Defendant drove the vehicle through the building's glass doors.
Defendant struck Mr. White with the vehicle, throwing him back approximately
ten feet. Mr. White arose from the ground and ran down a corridor to the west
lobby on the opposite side of the building. Defendant followed Mr. White down
the hallway and hit him with her vehicle a second time. After this second strike,
Mr. White flew over the hood of the vehicle and landed on the ground, injuring his
left leg. While Mr. White hobbled down a small hallway and hid in a service
closet, Defendant drove her vehicle through the glass windows of the west lobby,
reversed the vehicle back through the lobby, briefly pulled forward again, and
finally stopped.
^ 9 Defendant was charged with attempted murder, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(2) (Supp.2003), and criminal mischief, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106
(Supp.2002). She subsequently filed a motion in limine seeking a "pre-trial order
authorizing the defense of Extreme Emotional Distress to be presented as a
question of fact to the jury." Defendant argued that, on the date of the incident, she
had lost self-control due to stressors that had accumulated over time and that she
was therefore entitled to present a jury instruction for the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional distress. Defendant proffered evidence regarding the
dissolution of her relationship with Mr. White and the financial difficulties arising
after their separation. Additionally, she proffered facts regarding the unexpected
death of her therapist three weeks before the incident.—
FN1. Defendant was no longer covered by Mr. White's health insurance, and her
therapist was providing her with free samples of the medication she needed. When
the therapist died, Defendant was no longer able to receive the free samples.
According to Defendant, Mr. White was not supposed to have cancelled her

insurance coverage until a later date.
Tf 10 In response to Defendant's motion in limine, the prosecution proffered
additional evidence. Shortly after the attack, while still seated in her vehicle,
Defendant had called Mr. White's sister and told her that she thought she had just
killed Mr. White. Her tone of voice was reportedly matter-of-fact and
unemotional. Furthermore, when a deputy approached Defendant while she was
still seated in the driver's seat of her vehicle, the deputy observed that Defendant
was not crying, upset, or emotional. The same deputy observed one empty
prescription medication *650 bottle in Defendant's car and another in her purse.
Tf 11 The prosecution further proffered that in an interview with a detective at
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Defendant told the detective that she been in
a car accident and drove through a building because she took too much
medication. Defendant told the detective that she was on Xanax and Lexapro and
that she had taken nine Valium capsules before returning to Mr. White's workplace
that afternoon. Defendant expressed confusion about howr Mr. White could have
been injured and explained that she was just trying to chase him to get some
paperwork. She also told the detective that when Mr. White went inside the
building, her foot just went on the pedal and she went through the building.
Tj 12 Finally, the prosecution proffered that Defendant contacted the police in
December 2005 to report her suspicion that Mr. White had viewed and stored child
pornography on their home computer. The police reviewed the materials supplied
by Defendant and found no evidence of child pornography. The investigation
concluded, and charges were never brought against Mr. White.
U 13 The trial court denied Defendant's motion in limine, ruling that "[t]he
defense of extreme emotional distress is not applicable" to Defendant's case.
Specifically, the trial court held that "[t]he extreme emotional distress defense is
available only to defendants who have been subjected to stress that would cause
the average reasonable person to have an extreme emotional reaction and
experience a loss of self-control." The trial court concluded that the factors
proffered by Defendant did not meet that criteria because the stressors were not
sufficiently provocative or closely related in time to Defendant's purported loss of
self-control. Rather, the trial court determined that the stressors cited by Defendant
were common occurrences-marital difficulties, financial stress, divorce
complications, and death of a health care provider-many of which occurred weeks
to years before the April 26, 2006 incident. As a result, the trial court concluded
that there is "no rational basis in the evidence for [Defendant's theory that she
committed Attempted Manslaughter rather than Attempted Homicide."

Tf 14 Additionally, the trial court concluded that "[t]he circumstances of the
crime itself indicate that Defendant White had not lost self-control at the time of
the incident, but appeared to be acting in accordance with a plan." In support of
this conclusion, the trial court cited the fact that Defendant had returned to Mr.
White's workplace approximately four hours after the couple's disagreement and
the fact that Defendant negotiated a complicated driving pattern to pursue Mr.
White. According to the trial court, these facts "indicate[ ] that Defendant White
was aware of what she was doing and was in control of her faculties during the
time in question."
Tf 15 Defendant subsequently petitioned for interlocutory appeal, which we
granted.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f 16 Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion that there was
no basis in the evidence to justify a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional distress. More specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court
erred (1) by failing to evaluate the evidence presented from the subjective
viewpoint of Defendant and (2) by concluding that the stressors identified by
Defendant were "too remote in time" or were not of a sufficiently "provocative
character" to qualify as a trigger for extreme emotional distress. Defendant also
claims that the trial court improperly determined that she was acting according to a
plan rather than under a loss of self-control because such factual matters should be
resolved by the jury. "Whether a trial court committed error in refusing to give a
requested jury instruction is a question of law, which we review for correctness."
State v. Krueer, 2000 UT 60. f 11, 6 P.3d 1116.
ANALYSIS
\\1 Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to approve her
requested instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress.
Pursuant *651 to Utah statute, "[i]t is an affirmative defense to a charge of...
attempted murder that the defendant... attempted to cause the death of another ...
under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(i) (2008). "When a
criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a particular affirmative
defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence has been
presented ... that provides any reasonable basis upon which a jury could conclude
that the affirmative defense applies to the defendant." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58. ^j
25. 192 P.3d 867. However, a court need not give the requested jury instruction
where "the evidence in support [of the defendant's theory is] so slight that all
reasonable people would have to conclude against the defendant on that point."
State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998). In other words, the
requested jury instruction need not be given where the evidence is "so slight as to

be incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to whether ...
defendant [acted] ... while under the influence of an extreme emotional
disturbance." Id. at 872 (first omission in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Kell 2002 UT 106,1125 & n. 5, 61 P.3d 1019
, (concluding that evidence was insufficient to provide a rational basis for a jury
instruction on an affirmative defense because "[t]he great weight of the evidence
... runs contrary to [the uncorroborated testimony of the] defendant [ ]" offered in
support of the claim).
I. Objective Standard for Viewing Evidence
118 Defendant first claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that she
was not entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress because the
trial court did not view her proffered evidence from her subjective viewpoint. Utah
Code section 76-5-203(4) states that extreme emotional distress "for which there is
a reasonable explanation or excuse" is an affirmative defense to the charge of
attempted murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(i). Further, the statute
mandates that "[t]he reasonableness of an explanation or excuse ... be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances."
Id. § 76-5-203(4)(c). Relying on a New York case, People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d
668. 427 N.Y.S.2d 769. 404 N.E.2d 1310 (1980), Defendant asserts that the
statute's requirement to view the explanation or excuse in light of the then existing
circumstances obligates the trial court to view "the subjective, internal situation in
which the defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived
them at the time, however inaccurate that perception may have been." See id. at
1316. We disagree.
119 Defendant's reliance on Casassa is misplaced. The statute underlying the
Casassa court's decision required the reasonableness of an excuse "to be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be" Id. at 1315-16 (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). This language is not found in Utah's
current statute regarding the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. In
fact, comparable language was removed from Utah's statutory scheme. Prior to
1985, Utah's statute regarding manslaughter-the predecessor to the affirmative
defense at issue here-stated that "[t]he reasonableness of an explanation or excuse
of the actor ... shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be" Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-205(2) (1973) (emphasis added). With the 1985 amendments to this statute,
the legislature excised the phrase "as he believes them to be" and revised the
statute to read, "The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse ... shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances." Id. § 76-5-205(3) (Supp.1985). Although the legislature
subsequently recast extreme emotional distress manslaughter as an affirmative

defense to murder rather than a lesser included offense,— it retained the *652
language regarding the viewpoint through which the reasonableness of the excuse
is determined. Compare id. § 76-5-203(3)(aV(dU1999), with id § 76-5-203(4Vc)
(2008).
FN2. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, 192 P.3d 867, contains an overview of the
transition of manslaughter from a lesser included offense to an affirmative defense
to murder. See id. ^ 22.
TJ 20 Although a trial court is statutorily required to consider the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's extreme emotional distress, those circumstances must be
viewed from the viewpoint of a reasonable person. Thus, the legal standard is
whether the circumstances that a particular defendant faced were "such that the
average reasonable person would react by experiencing a loss of self-control."
State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 14. 152 P.3d 315 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The trial court correctly identified this legal standard and did not err in
evaluating whether the stressors proffered by Defendant would cause a reasonable
person to experience a loss of self-control.
II. Contemporaneous Provocation Required
^f 21 Defendant additionally argues that the trial court erred in refusing to adopt
her requested jury instruction based on the conclusion that Defendant had not
experienced a highly provocative, contemporaneous stress as a trigger for her
emotional distress. Utah courts have defined extreme emotional distress as
"intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, or excessive agitation,"
that "overwhelm[ ]" a person's reason. Id. % 14. The stress triggering these feelings
must be " 'an external event' " or an "external initiating circumstance." State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439. 472 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The stress that triggers extreme emotional
distress does not include "a condition resulting from mental illness" or "distress
that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct." Utah Code Ann. $
76-5-203(4)(b)(i)-(ii). Rather, feelings of extreme emotional distress are a result of
exposure to a stress that is "extremely unusual and overwhelming." Syillers, 2007
UT 13, \ 14, 152 P.3d 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
\ 22 Defendant points to State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94, and State
v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315, to support her contention that stressors that
alone are not highly provocative may nonetheless trigger extreme emotional
distress when those stressors accumulate over time. In Shumway, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction regarding
extreme emotional distress based on evidence that the victim "initiated a violent
and traumatic act by attacking [the defendant] with the knife," that the victim "had

a reputation for being a 'hothead' and losing his temper/' and that the defendant
"had been bullied and pushed around by his peers since he was in the third grade,
[which all] 'came out on [the victim]' when the [victim and the defendant] fought
over the knife." 2002 UT 124, ITU 11. 10. 63 P.3d 94. In SpiUers, the supreme court
held that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional
distress where the defendant shot the victim three times following an argument in
which the victim "accused [the defendant] of snitching on him to drug
enforcement agents regarding a drug deal." 2007 UT 13. ^ 3, 152 P.3d 315.
Among the evidence that the Spillers court concluded justified the instruction was
the fact that the victim "retrieved a firearm," "struck [the defendant] on the back
of the head," "cock[ed] his arm back to strike [the defendant] again," and "had a
reputation for violence." Id. ^ 16. Defendant emphasizes that two of the factors
considered by the supreme court-the reputation of the victim in both cases and the
bullying experienced by the minor defendant in Shumway-weve either acquired
over time or occurred years before the violent incident.
^f 23 Contrary to Defendant's contention, however, these cases reinforce the
requirement that a defendant's loss of self-control be in reaction to a highly
provocative triggering event. In Shumway, the defendant's violent act was
provoked when the victim "initiated" a fight by attacking the defendant with a
knife. See 2002 UT 124,^1 11. 63 P.3d 94. Likewise, in Spillers, the defendant
killed the victim immediately after an argument escalated and the victim
brandished a gun, *653 threatened the defendant, struck the defendant, and
attempted to strike him again. See 2007 UT 13. ^ 3 , 16, 152P.3d315. The
victims' reputations for violence and the Shumway defendant's history of being
bullied merely placed in context the contemporaneous and intense provocation
experienced by the defendants.
f 24 A highly provocative trigger has been consistently required for a defendant
in Utah to make a claim of extreme emotional distress. Where a defendant shot his
ex-girlfriend because she " 'just ran off at the mouth,' frustrated him, and hurt his
feelings," we concluded that there was no evidence supporting the defendant's
contention that he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress.
State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256. 263 (Utah Ct.App.1995). We stated, "Defendant is
remiss in his assertion that frustration and hurt feelings reach the level of extreme
emotional disturbance." Id_ The Utah Supreme Court similarly rejected a claim of
extreme emotional distress where the defendant shot the victim at the request of a
close personal friend after the victim had beat the friend's sister and disrespected
the friend's family. See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998). The
supreme court noted that the close personal friend had not "worked [the defendant]
into a frenzy" and "there [was] no evidence that [the defendant] himself would
find [the victim's disrespect of the friend's family] a particularly provocative act on
the victim's part." IcL_

Tf 25 Furthermore, Utah law requires that the highly provocative event must be
contemporaneous with the defendant's loss of self-control or such loss of selfcontrol cannot be attributed to extreme emotional distress. In State v. Clayton, 658
P.2d624 (Utah 1983), the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury on attempted manslaughter as a lesser included offense to attempted
murder,— citing the passage of time between the provocative event and the
defendant's violent action as determinative. See id. at 626. The defendant and the
victim in Clayton had fought at a bar, and friends broke up the fight after the
victim had pushed the defendant backward into a window. See id. at 625. The
defendant left the bar, returned fifteen or twenty minutes later with a gun, and then
confronted and shot the unarmed victim. See id_ The supreme court explained that
even a twenty-minute "passage of time between the fight and defendant's return to
the bar tends to negate the 'heat of passion' explanation" for the defendant's
actions. Id. at 626.
FN3. The lesser included offense to attempted murder at issue in State v. Clayton,
658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983), is the functional equivalent to the affirmative defense
to attempted murder in this case. See generally State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ^ 22,
192P.3d 867 ("In 1999, extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense
were removed from the manslaughter statute and inserted into the murder statute
as affirmative defenses to murder.").
Tf 26 Notwithstanding this case law, Defendant argues that she is entitled to the
requested jury instruction because the mistreatment she received from Mr. White
in the years preceding their divorce is relevant to the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional distress, just as ongoing domestic violence is relevant to a
claim of self-defense. As Defendant indicates, Utah statutory law allows a jury to
consider "any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship" to
determine whether a person may claim self-defense in using force against another.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(e) (2008). The legislature explicitly stated that
its intent in enacting this statute was to allow "otherwise competent evidence
regarding ... [the] response [by a victim of domestic violence] to patterns of
domestic abuse or violence [to] be considered by the trier of fact in determining
[the] imminence" of another's use of unlawful force "or [the] reasonableness" of
the domestic violence victim's belief that force is necessary to defend him or
herself. Id § 76-2-402 Legislative Intent.
Tf 27 This statute is inapplicable to Defendant's case. At no point in the
proceedings did Defendant allege that she believed that Mr. White was about to
use unlawful force against her or commit a forcible felony as he walked to his car,
or that she was attempting to prevent death or bodily injury as she chased Mr.

White with her vehicle. See generally id. § 76-2-402(1) (stating that a person may
only claim that his or her use of *654 force was self-defense when "he or she
reasonably believe[d] that force [was] necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
injury to himself or a third party as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful
force, or to prevent commission of a forcible felony"). And we find it significant
that the legislature has not enacted similar provisions in the statutory framework
for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress.
^J 28 Ultimately, the only contemporaneous, provocative event that preceded
Defendant's loss of self-control was Mr. White's use of a cell phone that he had
previously denied possessing. This event is not sufficiently provocative, even
when viewed in its unique context, to entitle Defendant to a jury instruction on the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. Although Defendant had the
opportunity to proffer as much evidence as she deemed necessary to show that she
qualified for this affirmative defense, the only other factors actually profferedmarital difficulties, financial stress, parenting issues, other difficulties with
divorce, and the death of a therapist-lack the requisite contemporaneous
relationship to her loss of self-control. The trial court therefore correctly
determined that the factors cited by Defendant do not rise to the level of an
"extremely unusual and overwhelming" stress and that there is no reasonable basis
in the proffered evidence upon which the jury could conclude that the defense of
extreme emotional distress applies to Defendant's crime.—
FN4. As we find these issues to be dispositive, we do not address Defendant's
other claim of error.
CONCLUSION
129 The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to adopt a jury
instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. The trial
court properly applied an objective standard for viewing the evidence proffered by
Defendant, and it correctly concluded that a highly provocative, contemporaneous
trigger is required for a person's loss of self-control to qualify as extreme
emotional distress.
^j 30 Accordingly, we affirm.
131 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judges.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
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Brenda Christine White,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on April 27, 2009.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Petitioner was
required to demonstrate a highly provocative and contemporaneous
triggering event as a prerequisite to an affirmative defense of
extreme disturbance.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 2 6(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

For The Court:

Dated

7-2 ^(ff
Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Regarding Defendant's
Motion in Limine re Extreme
Emotional Distress

BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE
Case No. 061902834
Defendant.
Hon. WILLIAM W. BARRETT

This matter came before the Court on October 19 , 2007. for a hearing regarding
the Defendant's Motion in Limine concerning the defense of Extreme Emotional
Distress. The Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Jason Schatz. The State
was represented by Alicia H. Cook and Stephen L. Nelson. The Court has received and
reviewed Defendant's Motion in Limine re Extreme Emotional Distress and supporting
memorandum, and the State's Reply. The Court heard oral argument from both parties
concerning the motion on October 191 , 2007.
Having fully considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good
cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The victim in this case, Jon White, was married to Defendant White for eleven
years before he left the marital home in November of 2005 and initiated divorce
proceedings.

2.

Mr. White worked for the Principal Financial Group in the Woodland Towers
building, located at 4021 South 700 East, which is where he was employed on the
day of the incident, April 26th, 2006. On that date, Defendant White went to Mr.
White's place of work during the lunch hour and asked Mr. White to sign a quitclaim deed to the marital home. Mr. White refused to sign and returned to work.

3.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., Mr. White left the Woodland Towers building and was
walking toward his car in a covered parking area when he heard the sound of
squealing tires. Mr. White saw Defendant White speeding toward him in her Ford
Explorer, and jumped between two parked cars. Mr. White jumped over a threefoot cement wall at the end of the covered parking structure, and ran through a
visitor parking lot back toward the Woodland Towers building. As Mr. White
approached the east entrance of the building, he turned and saw Defendant White
speeding through the visitor parking lot after him. Defendant White drove up onto
the sidewalk leading from the parking lot to the building, and turned the Explorer
toward the building. Mr. White ran through the first set of doors at the east
entrance, and Defendant White drove the Explorer through the glass doors.
Defendant White struck Mr. White with the Explorer and threw him back
approximately ten feet. Mr. White picked himself up off the ground and ran down a
corridor to the west lobby on the opposite side of the building. Defendant White
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chased Mr. White down the hallway and hit him with her vehicle a second time in
the west lobby. Mr. White flew over the hood of the Explorer and landed on the
ground. Mr. White stood to run away, but was unable to put any pressure on his left
leg. Mr. White hobbled down a smaller hallway until he found a service closet, and
hid there until he was discovered by a maintenance worker. Defendant White,
meanwhile, drove her vehicle entirely through the glass windows of the west lobby,
then reversed her vehicle back into the building and across the lobby. Defendant
White pulled forward again and stopped her vehicle in the middle of the lobby. The
incident was first reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office at 4:39 p.m..
In the defendant's motion in limine, Defendant White proffered the evidence that
she argued constituted a basis for extreme emotional distress. In summary, the
defendant proffered that Jon White forced Defendant White to engage in a
"threesome" with a co-worker, that Jon White viewed pornography and was
investigated for possession of child pornography, and that Defendant White
discovered that Mr. White was engaged in an extra-marital affair prior to their
separation. Defendant White also proffered that she was financially stressed after
the separation, that Jon White only spent the minimum visitation time with their
children, that Mr. White made the visitation schedule difficult, that Mr. White
denied owning a cell phone, and that Mr. White promised to assist her with
refinancing the marital home, but refused to cooperate in the refinance process.
Defendant White was also being supplied with medications by a nurse practitioner
named Valerie Talbot who died on March 20th, 2006, due to the fact that Mr. White
had cancelled the defendant from his insurance policy. The Court does not make
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any findings of fact concerning the proffered evidence because the Court does not
weigh the credibility of the evidence for purposes of this motion. (State v. Kruger,
6 P.3d 1116, 1119 ( U t S . Q . 2000).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defense of extreme emotional distress is not applicable to Defendant White's
case. The circumstances proffered by Defendant White do not constitute extreme
emotional distress, therefore there is no rational basis in the evidence for the
defendant's theory that she committed Attempted Manslaughter rather than
Attempted Homicide. Accordingly, the defendant has not presented a sufficient
quantum of evidence to warrant jury instructions on the defense of extreme
emotional distress and the lesser included offense of Attempted Manslaughter.
The factors proffered by Defendant White do not meet the definition of "extremely
unusual and overwhelming stress" given in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Ut.
S.Ct. 1988). The extreme emotional distress defense is available only to defendants
who have been subjected to stress that would cause the average reasonable person
to have an extreme emotional reaction and experience a loss of self-control.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471. Defendant White cites marital difficulties, financial stress,
difficulties with the divorce, and the death of Ms. Talbot as stressors that
accumulated over time to create a situation wherein she lost self-control on the day
of the incident. The Court, however, is required to evaluate how these stressors
would impact the average reasonable person, and whether these stressors would
cause a reasonable person to experience a loss of self control. The stressors cited
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by Defendant White do not rise to this level; they are common occurrences that are
endured by many people, and in this case do not justify the attempted homicide of
Jon White.
The reasonableness of these stressors as an adequate excuse or explanation for a
loss of self-control is further diminished by the length of time between the stressors
and the incident. Several of the stressors that Defendant White proffers (the
threesome, the pornography investigation, and the death of Ms. Talbot) occurred
several weeks to years before April 26th, 2006. Furthermore, the Court has
reviewed the two most recent decisions of the Utah appellate courts dealing with
extreme emotional distress, and has noted that in both cases a highly provocative
event occurred immediately before the crime. (State v. Shumway, 3 P.3d 94; State
v. Spillers, 152 P.2d 315 (Ut. S.Ct. 2007). In the case at bar, there is a complete
absence of a similarly provocative event on or near the day in question.
The circumstances of the crime itself indicate that Defendant White had not lost
self-control at the time of the incident, but appeared to be acting in accordance with
a plan. The disagreement about the quit-claim deed occurred during the noon hour,
and the crime occurred more than four hours later at approximately 4:30, when Mr.
White was walking across the parking lot toward his vehicle. The complicated
driving pattern that Defendant White negotiated to pursue Mr. White also indicates
that Defendant White was aware of what she was doing and was in control of her
faculties during the time in question.
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ORDER

Defendant White's Motion in Limine regarding Extreme Emotional Distress is
denied. The information that Defendant White has proffered does not constitute evidence
of extreme emotional distress, and therefore is irrelevant to that defense and may not be
presented as evidence of extreme emotional distress.

Dated this

V day of

r, 2007.

By the Court:

WILLIAM W. B
Third District Court"\j^gS7i^^tf ?

Approved as to form:

Jason Schatz
Counsel for Defendant
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